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ABstrACt
This article criticizes John Rawls’ conception of political 
liberalism, which insists that political sphere governed by 
his two principles of justice can be separated from any 
comprehensive moral doctrines, and that the validity of 
his conception of justice is political, not metaphysical 
nor comprehensive. I argue that Rawls’ project is flawed 
by showing that his two principles of justice and political 
liberalism are presupposed by the very comprehensive/
metaphysical doctrines which he denies. Whether he 
realizes it or not Rawls chooses a particular comprehensive 
theory of the good/person, specifically that of an 
unencumbered self. I discuss Rawls’ political liberalism 
from two points of view. First, I discuss Rawls’ political 
liberalism from political economy points of view, which 
I argue that the foundation of Rawls’ principles of justice 
lies in his particular theory of the person. Second, I discuss 
Rawls’ political liberalism from philosophical points of 
view, which I argues that Rawls’ political liberalism and 
theory of the person are comprehensive, and that political 
sphere cannot be separated from private sphere.
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introduction
This article aims to criticize John Rawls’ political liberalism, which 
proposes that his principles of justice governing public sphere are derived 
from none of any comprehensive moral doctrines so that they should 
be acceptable to ‘everyone’ whose moral comprehensive doctrines are 
different; it is not only possible, but also ought to separate justice from any 
comprehensive doctrines. In other words, he claims that his principles of 
justice are justified on the basis of a political consensus, which is neutral 
among competing conceptions of comprehensive doctrine. I will argue 
that Rawls’ political liberalism is flawed in the sense that his principles 
of justice are far from being neutral, and that it is impossible to separate 
political sphere from any comprehensive doctrines as he claims. The 
political sphere requires a judgment of comprehensive moral doctrines 
instead of the claim of neutrality between them. 
 This article consists of three main parts. First, I give an outline 
of Rawls’ political liberalism, which I link his Theory of Justice (1971) 
with his Political Liberalism (1993), and other works such as The Law 
of Peoples (1999). I argue that Rawls’ project is to preserve Kantian 
morality without referring to any comprehensive doctrines as Kant did. 
Second, I discuss how Rawls’ principles of justice are really justified from 
the perspective of political economy, especially from works of Harsanyi 
(1975; 1977) and Hampton (1980). In this section I show that the secret 
of Rawls’ principle of justice is not based on the social contract, but on 
his particular theory of the person or the circumstances of justice in the 
original position. Finally, I discuss how Rawls’ theory of the person is 
comprehensive rather than political, in which I argue that it is comprehensive 
because it is justified on the basis of rationality which one needs to assume 
what characteristics can be called rational and good or just in the first place.
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rawls’ political liberalism: An outline
In A Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls’ powerful claim is that any 
theory of justice governing the whole society must be acceptable to ‘everyone’ 
in the society. One of the most important tasks of Rawls (1971) is to 
defeat utilitarianism, the dominant theory in economics and political 
philosophy at that time, in defining “justice” for the society, which argues 
that any just principle governing the whole society must maximize the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number (Bentham, 1879; Harsanyi, 
1975; Sandel, 1994; Swift, 2014). According Rawls, utilitarianism is not 
a proper principle of justice because its violation of the principle of the 
separateness of persons; it prioritizes the welfare of society as a whole 
over individual rights, as Rawls (1971, pp.3-4) argues:
“Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice 
that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. 
For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for 
some is made right by a greater good shared by others. 
It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are 
outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by 
many. Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal 
citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice 
are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of 
social interests. The only thing that permits us to acquiesce in 
an erroneous theory is the lack of a better one; analogously, 
an injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid 
an even greater injustice. Being first virtues of human 
activities, truth and justice are uncompromising.”
Rawls, like other social contract theorists like Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau, and Kant, tries to base the justification of the principle of 
justice on the agreement of individuals. Metaphysically, they all believe 
that there is no right principles independent of and prior to individuals 
themselves; instead, justice or right principles must be found in individuals 
themselves, as Rawls (1980) argues that “the parties to the original 
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position do not agree on what the moral facts are, as if there were already 
such facts. It is not that, being situated impartially, they have a clear 
and undistorted view of a prior and independent moral order. Rather (for 
constructivism), there is no such order, and therefore no such facts apart 
from the procedure as a whole” (underline added) (p. 568). Therefore, 
Rawls’ project is to show that his principles of justice is justified not 
because of any merit or moral desert, but of a social contract; that his 
principles of justice is not based on any particular conception of the good, 
but simply on an agreement of individuals.
It should be noted that Rawls’ project is very influenced by Kant’s 
morality in the sense that both of them try to separate justice as a first 
principle from any particular conception of the good. For Kant, to act 
morally is to act as a rational being whose moral duty is determined by 
the universal maxim rather than his own desires or happiness. This is not 
to say that desires and happiness are wrong and should be eliminated, 
but that they are inappropriate to be the first principle that every rational 
being can will as a universal maxim (Kant, 1785). Kant proposes that, 
as a rational being, we must prioritize the noumenal self, whose actions 
are determined by pure practical reason which is independent from any 
conception of the good life, over the phenomenal self whose actions are 
determined by our own conception of the good life. It is not that Kant 
does not want us to live according to our conception of the good, but Kant 
thinks that it is wrong to set any particular conception of the good as the 
moral constraints for all of us, as Kant (1788) argues that “the concept 
of good and evil is not defined prior to the moral law, to which, it would 
seem, the former would have to serve as foundation; rather the concept 
of good and evil must be defined after and by means of the law” (p.65). 
This idea can be called deontological liberalism (Sandel, 1982). 
Rawls (1971), despite the very influence of Kant, tries to make 
deontological liberalism more acceptable to contemporary political 
philosophy by insisting that deontological liberalism can be affirmed by 
the phenomenal self rather than the noumenal self (p.264, 587). Since 
Kant’s project is to put individuals into the noumenal world which is very 
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metaphysically controversial, Rawls tries to justify the moral law without 
requiring individuals to forgo their own conceptions of the good (Sandel, 
1982, p.23). In other words, Rawls’ project is to show how individuals 
who are free to pursue any conception of the good eventually come to 
agree upon the same first principle. At first glance it seems that Rawls’ 
principles of justice are not separated from a conception of the good, 
but, indeed, they are separated because, according to Rawls’ logic, even 
though his principles of justice were chosen by individuals who have 
different conceptions of the good, the fact that they would be accepted 
by everyone reflects that his principles of justice are not based on any 
particular conception of the good. In other words, since the theories of 
justice are universally accepted by “every” conception of the good, and 
not based on any “particular” conception of the good, they are neutral 
between competing conceptions of the good. In this sense Rawls confirms 
Kant’s deontological liberalism which bases justice as the first principle 
on the primacy of right rather than any particular conception of the good 
(Sandel, 1982). Therefore one way to critique Rawls is to show how his 
theory of justice is actually based on a particular conception of the good 
rather than some neutrality between them, and this is my primary task 
in this article.
But it is very important to understand that what Rawls means by 
‘everyone’ here is ‘hypothetical’ persons, not ‘actual’ persons; only the 
former is regarded as a moral agent who is entitled to participate in the 
deliberation of principles of justice, while the latter is not because they are 
not yet guaranteed by certain circumstances of justice. In order to come 
up with a theory of justice, Rawls creates the original position and the 
veil of ignorance as a thought experiment1 to reach a social agreement. 
The original position is the state where everyone is assumed to inhabit 
before entering into the actual society. The veil of ignorance is the idea 
that people in the original position should be blind to any conception of 
the good at all in the sense that they must decide any theory of justice 
without knowing what social position and conception of the good they 
are going to take until the veil of ignorance is uncovered. In other words, 
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individuals in the original position must conceive themselves as rational 
beings who want to maximize their position (the maximin principle), 
but do not know yet what conception of the good they will pursue. By 
doing so, everyone would reach the same principles of justice which 
would consist of “(1) Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of basic liberties compatible with a similar system 
of liberty for all. (2) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, 
and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of 
fair equality of opportunity” (Swift, 2014, p.25). These two principles of 
justice determine the roles of the state and political institutions.
 His theories of justice have been criticized by communitarians 
like MacIntyre (1981), Sandel (1982; 1984), Walzer (1983), and Taylor 
(1985a; 1985b; 1989) that he fails to understand the metaphysical conception 
of the person; they argue that we could not conceive of ourselves as 
a rational being whose self is prior to our given goods/ends as Rawls 
assumes in the original position. Thus, Rawls’s principles of justice are not 
appropriate to do justice for actual persons (Mulhall & Swift, 1996). In 
response to those criticism, Rawls proposes the idea of political liberalism 
(Rawls, 1977; 1985; 1987; 1988; 1989; 1993; 1999). The main argument 
of political liberalism is that his two principles of justice do not require 
that everyone must apply liberal doctrine to their personal affairs and think 
of themselves as a rational being whose self is antecedent to their ends/
goods all the time; they just need to be liberal in political sphere where 
they need to decide about the best principle of justice for a well-ordered 
society; his principles of justice do not rule out any ‘reasonable’ moral 
comprehensive doctrines. 
 In this sense, his liberalism is different from Kant’s and Mill’s, 
which are comprehensive liberalism; while Rawls claims that people need 
to be liberal in political sphere only, not in personal affairs, Kant and 
Mill claim that they need to be liberal in both of their public and private 
spheres. As Rawls (1993) argues that “this idea of a shared political life 
does not invoke Kant’s idea of autonomy, or Mill’s idea of individuality, 
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as moral values belonging to a comprehensive doctrine. The appeal is 
rather to the political value of a public life conducted on terms that all 
reasonable citizens can accept as fair” (p.98), and that “the first difference 
is that Kant’s doctrine is a comprehensive moral view in which the ideal of 
autonomy has a regulative role for all of life. This makes it incompatible 
with the political liberalism of justice as fairness” (p.99). To put it another 
way, Rawls thinks that it is possible to separate political sphere from any 
moral comprehensive doctrines, and everyone, including communitarian 
critics, should legitimize his principles of justice as they are just political, 
not comprehensive. Next I will show how his principles of justice are not 
merely political but comprehensive, and thus, his political liberalism cannot 
claim its neutrality between competing conceptions of the comprehensive 
doctrines.
 It should be noted that what Rawls (1993) really proposes to 
revise is not about his two principles of justice proposed in Rawls (1971) 
at all, but he merely revised how we should understand them. As Rawls 
(1993) writes that “all these elements [two principles of justice] are still 
in place, as they were in [A Theory of Justice]; and so is the basis of the 
argument for them. Hence I presuppose throughout these lectures the 
same egalitarian conception of justice as before; and though I mention 
revisions from time to time, none of them affect this feature of it” (p.7), 
and what he really wants to propose about political liberalism is that 
“political liberalism, then, aims for a political conception of justice as a 
freestanding view. It offers no specific metaphysical or epistemological 
doctrine beyond what is implied by the political conception itself. As 
an account of political values, a free standing political conception does 
not deny there being other values that apply, say, to the personal, the 
familial, and the associational; nor does it say that political values are 
separate from, or discontinuous with, other values” (p.10). Therefore, if 
I can prove that Rawls’ two principles of justice are comprehensive and 
metaphysical rather than political, then this can prove that Rawls’ political 
liberalism is also comprehensive, not merely political; Rawls’ political 
liberalism is inconsistent.
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A theory of the person and the impossible project of political 
liberalism
My main argument is that Rawls has a particular comprehensive 
theory of the person. I intentionally use the term ‘comprehensive’ rather 
than mere ‘metaphysical’ or ‘moral philosophy’ because although Rawls 
may claim that his theory is not metaphysical2 (Rawls, 1985), he cannot 
deny that his theory suggests a particular conception of the artificial 
person in the original position (Rawls, 1993, p.75). For example, Rawls 
may say that his political liberalism does not rely on a particular theory 
of actual person, whether they are unencumbered or encumbered selves. 
This may make him avoid the metaphysical debate about the real nature 
of the person by claiming that his theory does not say that the person 
described in the original position must be true in the reality. He may reason 
that he needs to ‘assume’ some certain characteristics3 of the person in the 
original position just for the sake of representation, and does not mean that 
he actually thinks that the real person must really possess those certain 
characteristics. But I will argue that this does not make his theory of the 
person in the original position less comprehensive. The most important 
question is why Rawls must ‘assume’ those certain characteristics of the 
person in the original as the way he does? Why does he think that the moral 
power ‘should’ be given to ‘each individual’ rather than the community? 
 To criticize Rawls’ political liberalism, I divide the discussion 
into two main parts: (1) I will show how Rawls’ original position and 
principles of justice can be criticized from political economy points of 
view, which will tell us that Rawls’ argument is not based on any social 
contract, and the secret of his principle of justice lies in a theory of the 
person; (2) I will show how Rawls’ political liberalism can be criticized 
from philosophical points of view, which will tell us that Rawls’ argument 
and his theory of the person is not neutral between competing conceptions 
of the good as he claims.
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A political economy Critique of rawls’ theory of Justice
Before I will discuss this philosophically, I would like to show 
that even those who agree with him about the role of the original position 
and that each individual should be given the moral power equally may 
disagree with him about principles individuals would choose. Harsanyi 
(1975; 1977) are good examples. He agrees that the original position is 
an indispensable condition of the social contract, but he disagrees that 
parties in the original position would always adopt the maximin principle 
as Rawls claims. Harsanyi (1977) proposes to separate “moral” preferences 
from “personal” preferences. Moral preferences refer to the decisions 
of individuals in the situation where they are all ignorant of their actual 
particular preferences. He believes that to decide this way they all must 
decide universally as if they take everyone’s preferences into account. 
Personal preferences refer to the decision of individuals in the situation 
where they all know their actual places in the society. Even though 
Harsanyi embraces the same idea as Rawls’ original position, he does 
not assume that parties in the original position would adopt the maximin 
principle as Rawls does, and this indicates that different theories of the 
person (how should they behave?) amount to different characteristics of 
principles of justice.
Harsanyi (1975) proposes that parties in the original position 
would choose any principles of justice according to the average utility 
maximization principle (p.598). He argues that if a society has a mentally 
retarded individual and other normal individuals, and if the only way 
to improve the mentally retarded one is an expensive treatment which 
requires diverting funds from the education of normal people, and if this 
treatment can only improve the mentally retarded person only slightly, 
then what principle would parties in the original position choose? 
According to the maximin principle, they should want the treatment to 
be done because it improves the least advantaged member of the society. 
But Harsanyi argues that this is irrational (p.597), and he proposes that 
parties would adopt the average utility maximization principle which 
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assumes that everyone has the same probability (1/n); they have to choose 
social systems which yield a higher average utility level. For the sake of 
simplicity, let’s consider the figure 1 as follows.
p1 p2 Average
A 100 200 150
B 145 145 145
C 144 600 372
figure 1 how would parities in the original position choose?
According to the figure 1, let’s assume that there are two persons 
(P1 and P2) whom parties in the original position may turn out to be, and 
there are three states of the world or social systems (A, B, and C) that 
might happen to each person. The rows can be read as follows: of the 
state A, we have a 1/2 probability of being born as P1 with 100 utility, 
and P2 with 200 utility; of the state B, we have a 1/2 probability of being 
born as P1 with 145 utility, and P2 with 145 utility; of the state C, we 
have a 1/2 probability of being born as P1 with 144 utility, and P2 with 
600 utility. The question is what social systems or principles of justice 
we would choose? According to Rawls’ maximin principle, we would 
choose the state B because this social system makes us maximize the least 
advantaged; since the least advantaged of the state A receives 100, of the 
state B receives 145, and of the state C receives 144, a rational being 
who adopts the maximize principle must go for the state or social system 
B. But, according to Harsanyi’s average utility maximization principle, 
we should choose the state C because this social system makes us maximize 
the average utility, which is 372, while the state A and B give us only 
150 and 142, respectively.
Even if we follow Rawls’ experiment of the original position 
and the veil of ignorance, we do not need to agree with him that his two 
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principles of justice will always be chosen. This indicates that Rawls’ 
attempt to make the social contract more acceptable has certain problems. 
Rawls’ two principles of justice lies not in the pure procedure of the social 
contract, but in the certain characteristics of the hypothetical person in the 
original position. In this sense a theory of the person plays a significant 
role in determining any principle of justice. Even though Rawls may claim 
that his theory of the person is merely a thought experiment rather than 
the metaphysical truth, he cannot deny that the discussion of a theory of 
the person is very important as different characteristics of the person lead 
to different principles of justice; thus communitarian critique of Rawls’ 
theory of the person is very relevant and powerful.
Kymlicka (1989) defends Rawls’ political liberalism4 on the basis 
that it does not take a “possessive individualist theory of motivation” 
(pp.887-8). He argues that Rawls’s political liberalism does not take the 
view that “what people want in life is to maximize their share of social 
resources (rather than promote the good of others), and indeed to maximize 
their material good (rather than promote their spiritual or emotional 
well-being)” (p.886). Instead Rawls allows everyone to pursue their own 
conceptions of the good life; no one is barred from taking other people’s 
welfare and spiritual well-being into account. This implies that Rawls’ 
political liberalism is far from being comprehensive liberalism which 
biased against some particular way of life. To put it simply, according 
to Kymlicka and Rawls, political liberalism does not take any particular 
comprehensive theory of the person as everyone is still allowed to take 
any comprehensive theory of the person as they see fit. But I believe this 
argument is flawed.
First of all, Kymlicka and even Rawls himself misunderstand that 
communitarians like MacIntyre, Sandel, and Taylor discuss a theory of 
the person “before” the original position and the veil of ignorance are 
taken out, not “after” that. As I just said, a theory of the person in the 
original position is very important to justify the principles of justice 
because different theories lead to different principles, and we have seen 
that Rawls’ theory of the person is merely one of possible alternatives 
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rather than the only conceivable one, so whatever theory of the person 
Rawls chooses, he cannot deny that it is based on a particular conception 
of the person rather than a neutrality between competing conceptions. 
Before I will continue discussing a theory of the person, I would like 
to show that, indeed, Rawls’ social contract theory is not really a social 
contract argument because according to any social contract theory, a just 
principle must be justified on the basis of individual agreements rather 
than of any independent principle. 
For example, if P1 and P2 come to agree upon the social system 
B, then we say that the state B is just not because it is just by itself but 
because it is the result of the contract, and if both P1 and P2 change the 
content of the contract to other systems (A or C), then we say that the 
state B is not just anymore. This means that any just principle of justice 
must be the result of the contract, not something just in itself. In this sense 
Rawls’ argument is far from being called the social contract because his 
argument does not allow any changes of the content of the contract at all, 
and, most importantly, his theory of the person is characterized by himself 
“before” any actual person and contract occur; this means that his theory 
of the person is justified independently of any result of the contract. As 
I said, since different theories of the person lead to different principles of 
justice, and Rawls’ theory of the person is assumed “before” any social 
contract happens, Rawls cannot deny that his principles of justice are 
justified not based on the social contract, but on his particular conception 
of the good. I will defend my argument through the discussion of Hampton 
(1980)’s argument.
For Hampton, any contract must be the procedure of mediation 
between two or more parties who have different preferences and needs5, 
and the contract must be irrevocable until every party voluntarily agrees 
to end or redo the contract; any contract must be based on the procedure 
rather than the finality (the content of the contract). For example, if Mr.A 
lends Mr.B a certain amount of money and Mr.B promises to repay Mr.A 
that certain amount of money with another certain amount of interest, 
the contract must be irrevocable until both Mr.A and Mr.B voluntarily 
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agree to end or redo some characteristics of the contract. This is the 
reciprocity condition. But in the original position every party is forced 
to have the same preference (risk-aversion) and goal (maximin rule), to 
face the same situation (complete uncertainty); everyone is forced to be 
the same person and they actually contract with themselves rather than 
other people at all. Even though Rawls may argue that they need to take 
into consideration other people’s needs (the demands of reciprocity), he 
fails to understand that the reciprocity condition requires two things that 
are unavailable in his original position: (1) every party must be allowed 
to represent his own preference and advantages from their point of view; 
(2) every involved party must be allowed to end/redo the agreement at 
any time they all want. All of this means that the reciprocity condition 
cannot ensure any principle as the finality because it just ensures that each 
party voluntarily agrees upon an agreement, whatever characteristics of 
the contract. But Rawls seems to suggest that the original position, plus 
the veil of ignorance, require the reciprocity condition, and thus the two 
principles of justice are chosen by a social choice process. 
Hampton rightly argues that Rawls’ two principles of justice 
are actually chosen by individual choice, not social choice because the 
reciprocity condition cannot guarantee any principle as the unconditional 
finality. Thus even though every party in the original position may actually 
choose the two principles of justice, they are entitled to change them at 
any time they all agree to do so; the two principles of justice must be 
contingent, conditional, and revocable. As we have seen that parties in the 
original position do not necessarily need to adopt the maximin principle 
and choose two principles of justice as Rawls expects, therefore to prevent 
any other principle than the two principles to be reached, Rawls needs 
to ‘force’ every party to accept the two principles as the unconditional 
finality. Now we can see that Rawlsian theory is inconsistent; if he claims 
that any principle of justice is justified only if it is the result of the contract, 
then he must not take any contract as the unconditional finality, but if he 
claims that the two principles are always the finality, then he must rule out 
any attempt to redo the contract even though every party agrees to do so. 
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For Hampton, Rawlsian contract is merely an individual choice 
under conditions of uncertainty; an individual has to choose the best 
possible outcome for himself without a consideration of other people 
because there are no longer other people; even though there are a million 
people, there are no real “other people” in the Rawlsian contract insofar 
as everyone is forced to have the same preference (the more, the better) 
and same way of reasoning (maximin rule). According to Rawls, if one 
is not sure if he will be born in a rich or poor family, then he needs a 
principle of justice that makes him better off if he actually turns out to be 
a poor, and since everyone thinks in the same way, everyone finally 
agrees upon the same principle of justice. This seems to be the result of 
contract, but actually it is not. The key word lies in the assumption that 
‘everyone is the same’ which implies that everyone has no different goals; 
everyone has the same goal in the first place. The question is that if there 
is no any different goal among parties, then on what point do they need 
any contract in the first place? If there is no conflict about the way of 
reasoning and they are all the same person, why do they need to come 
to contract with each other in the first place? In this sense Hampton is 
right in saying that there is no contract in the original position because 
everyone has the same preference and goal, thus there is no need to have 
a contract among them in the first place.
Now I want to show how, according to Hampton’s argument, 
Rawls’ original position does not raise problems of social choice at all. 
I will do so by using my own representation. The real problem (puzzle) 
of social choice is about how to reach an agreement among different 
preferences. Problems of social choice are raised in Arrow’s Impossibility 
(Arrow, 1951). One Impossibility is the ‘unrestricted domain’ axiom which 
requires that all preferences are allowed, but Rawlsian theory violates the 
unrestricted domain as it rules out some certain preferences in the first 
place. Let me make this argument more concretely. Let’s assume that 
there are three persons – Rich, Middle, Poor – in which Rich is assumed 
to be the most advantaged, Middle is the middle advantaged, and Poor is 
the least advantaged, and there are three policies (A, B, C). Let’s assume 
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also that Policy A is most favored by Rich, B by Middle, and C by Poor. 
This can be put in table as the following figure 2:
rich middle poor
most preferable A B C
middle preferable B C A
least preferable C A B
figure 2  problem of social Choice6
From the Figure 2, any social decision cannot be made as the 
following reasons. According to Rich, A > B > C, hence we can say that 
A > B and B > C. According to Middle, B > C > A, hence we can say 
that A < B and B > C. According to Poor, C > A > B, hence we can say 
that A > B and B < C. We can see that Policy A is preferred over Policy 
B by a 2-1 margin, that is, Rich and Poor prefer A to B, while Middle 
prefers B to A; and that Policy B is also preferred over Policy C by a 2-1 
margin, that is, Rich and Middle prefer B to C, while Poor prefers C to B. 
Since there are three persons in the society, if we use the majoritarian 
rule, then the society should choose Policy A because A is preferred over 
B, and B over C. However, this social choice does not hold because of its 
irrationality. According to the principle of rationality, individuals must 
be able to tell what they prefer (completeness) and the correct order of 
their preferable choices (transitivity). For example, someone is rational if 
he can tell that he prefers A to B, and B to C (complete), and he can also 
tell that he prefers A to C (transitive) (Hausman & McPherson, 1996). 
Therefore, in the figure 2, if A is preferred over B and B over C, then A 
must be preferred over C always. But this is not the case as, indeed, we 
found that C is preferred over A, not vice versa; that is, Rich is the only 
one who prefers A to C, while Middle and Poor prefers C to A. Therefore, 
from the figure 2, we can have the following social ordering: A > B and 
B > C, but A < C, which is irrational and any social choice or principle 
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of justice cannot be made through the social contract.
According to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, insofar as those 
ranking preferences from the figure 2 are allowed, any social decision 
cannot be made because any social rank is inconsistent. According to 
Sen’s Liberal Paradox, any social decision cannot be made because any 
social decision violates the minimal liberty (Sen, 1970; 1983; 1984). This 
raises problems of social choice: how to make a social decision which 
is transitive (Arrow) or consistent with the minimal liberty (Sen). But 
the Rawlsian contract would solve this problem by ‘forcing’ three of 
them to be the same person who faces the same situation, that is, no one 
actually knows their own preferences and that of others. In the original 
position, for example, Rich cannot claim his own preferences (A > B 
> C) in the first place because he may turn out to be Middle and Poor 
equally. Therefore, he must think of the worst case (Poor) and, according 
to the maximum rule, he must choose a policy that maximizes his worst 
outcome, that is, he must choose Policy C. At the end, everyone should 
prefer Policy C, and this seems to be a social decision. But we can see that 
this is not because it violates the unrestricted domain axiom. According 
to Hampton (1980), the original position is the place where there are no 
differing preferences and all people are “faced with the same problem 
of uncertainty” and “there is only a series of independent but identical 
deliberation” (p. 326). Therefore, Rawlsian contract does not actually 
raise problems of social choice, and cannot be called a social contract.
The question is if Rawls’ two principles are not justified by a social 
contract (voluntary agreement), then what justifies them? I suggest that 
the original position and the veil of ignorance are not just conditions of 
justice as Rawls claims, but they are the normative justification of the two 
principles itself. The original position already provides what is justified 
and what is not by ruling out some certain motivations and preferences in 
the first place (restricted domain). It is not surprising at all that individuals 
in the original position choose the two principles because they are ‘forced’ 
to do so in the first place. Rawls’ argument is at best a rational choice 
theory, not a social choice theory: while the former assumes a certain 
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motivation, the latter does not. Now we can see that Rawls’ justification 
of his two principles of justice cannot be justified by social contract 
argument, but by his own particular conception of the good which is 
realized in the form of the circumstances of justice; since different 
circumstances of justice and theories of the person lead to different 
principles of justice, Rawls’ secret of two principles of justice lies not 
in the social choice, but in his particular theory of the person. The next 
question I will deal with is if Rawls’ theory of the person is comprehensive 
and metaphysical?
A philosophical Critique of rawls’ political liberalism
I think that political liberalism is comprehensive because it is 
very individualistic and biased against some other ways of life. This is 
absolutely not to say that political liberalism and individualism as such 
are morally wrong, but simply that the fundamental idea of political 
liberalism, which is the belief that it is free of any comprehensive and 
metaphysical controversies and that it has no says about private sphere, 
is indefensible. Even though it is true that it does not say that the only 
motivation of individuals is to maximize their own utility or be self- 
interested, it obviously says that each individual equally has the moral 
power to choose their own conceptions of the good life. The question is 
that if Rawls claims that he does not take any particular comprehensive 
theory of the person, why does he assume that it is ‘each individual’ who 
should have the moral power rather than the community or why everyone 
should be morally equal in the first place? According to Sandel (1982; 
1984), human beings are encumbered selves in the sense that our ends 
are prior to our selves and our community is constituted of our selves, so 
it is wrong to conceive a person as an unencumbered self7 whose self is 
prior to the good and the community is conceived in the sentimental sense.
Rawls would argue that political liberalism does not demand that 
everyone must conceive of themselves as an unencumbered self; instead, 
insofar as they ‘voluntarily’ choose to be encumbered selves, no one can 
intervene in their decision. But this argument fails to realize that it still 
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gives the moral power to ‘each individual’ in the first place. Even though 
people may have different kinds of motivation and conceptions of the 
self, their actions are still justified/legitimated on the basis of ‘freedom 
of choice’ of individuals, and an encumbered self is important at best as 
the second-order justification. As we have seen and will see more, Rawls’ 
principles of justice, which were chosen by rational/unencumbered beings 
in the original position, are the first virtue of all institutions and even our 
private lives in such a way that if there is a conflict between principles of 
justice and our subjective conceptions of the good, the former must be 
decisive always. In this sense Rawls always gives the priority of principles 
endorsed by an unencumbered self over any other principles. In other 
words, Rawls conceives the person as an unencumbered self all the 
time. To understand my argument clearer, I will show how Rawls takes 
a particular comprehensive theory of the person in the original position 
and why his difference principle is very comprehensive, and then why he 
fails to distinguish between political sphere and comprehensive sphere.
In the original position, Rawls takes the deontological theory 
of the person in the sense that everyone is assumed to be blind to any 
conception of the good, and they must think of themselves as a self-interested 
unencumbered self. Although Rawls may claim that this is just a device, he 
cannot deny that the characteristic he assigns to the person is merely one 
of all possible alternatives, as I have shown in the previous section, and 
more importantly, he cannot deny that he already accepts the possibility 
of the self-interested motivation. Why does he think that one ‘can’ be 
self-interested? Of course, he does not say that one ‘should’ be self- 
interested, but he actually thinks that it is ‘permissible’ and ‘acceptable’ 
for one to be self-interested. He should be aware that to be called ‘moral 
comprehensive doctrines’ (non-neutrality), one does not need to suggest 
that the right thing to do is to do a particular action and think in a certain 
way, but, indeed, it is enough to judge that what action is permissible 
and what action is not. In this sense, political liberalism, which insists 
that one ‘can’ do whatever they want, given that they do not physically8 
harm other people, is a kind of comprehensive doctrine despite the fact 
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that it does not suggest what particular actions people ‘should’ do. For 
example, liberals may say that one ‘can’ choose whether to donate to a 
charity or not. Of course, they do not say that one ‘should’ or must donate 
to a charity, but they accept the possibility of both choices (donate and 
not donate) in the first place. This means that they already judge that it 
is acceptable not to donate, so their judgement is based on the premise 
that one should be conceived as an unencumbered self.
I argue that there are two main answers to the question of why 
we should hold that everyone is morally equal in the first place? One is 
metaphysical/comprehensive, another is political. I will show that only the 
former can be defensible, while the latter, which is held by Rawls, cannot. 
A Comprehensive theory of the person
There are many reasons for accepting the notion that everyone 
should be morally equal. John Locke (1690) argues that everyone has 
natural rights to life, liberty, and property which are determined by natural 
laws (p.9). It should be noted that these natural rights and laws are given 
by God. As Locke (1690) writes that, 
In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares 
himself to live by another rule than that of reason and 
common equality, which is that measure God has set to 
the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he 
becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure 
them from injury and violence, being slightly and broken 
by him (p.10). 
God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also 
given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage 
of life, and convenience (p.18). 
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As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of 
life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a 
property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, 
and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man 
to spoil or destroy (pp.20-1). 
God having made man such a creature, that in his own 
judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him 
under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and 
inclination to drive him into society, as well as fitted him 
with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it 
(p.42). 
God and nature never allowing man so to abandon himself, 
as to neglect his own preservation: and since he cannot 
take away his own life, neither can he give another power 
to take it (p.88).
Locke’s argument is based on a very comprehensive/metaphysical 
theory of the person as he argues that a person’s essence (true nature) is 
given by God, and to act morally is to act according to God’s command. 
Many would find the notion that everyone should be morally equal 
because it is the command of God is very comprehensive and vulnerable to 
objection as the existence of God, is extremely controversial. Even though 
I agree that Locke’s argument is quite controversial, I do not think that 
we can defeat his argument by claiming that there are better arguments 
which are less controversial/comprehensive. In other words, I would like 
to suggest that if we want to defeat Locke’s argument, we cannot argue 
that his argument is wrong because it is controversial, but because it is 
too unreasonable; since every theory of the person is very controversial 
and comprehensive, so the best argument is not the one which is less 
controversial/comprehensive, but the one which is more reasonable. This 
is a very important issue which I will discuss later.
Aristotle argues that a person’s essence is a social being whose ends 
are given by its own teleology or merits, which he argues that happiness 
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is the most noble virtue we all should attain in our lives together, and 
governments should exist not only to protect freedom but also to promote 
those virtues/goods of individuals. Aristotle’s theory of the person is 
different from that of Locke in that the telos or nature of a person is not 
given by God, but by the nature itself, as Brown (2009) argues that “there 
is a way human beings ought to be and ought to live. This is not because 
god created them for a purpose – something Aristotle did not hold – but 
simply because they are a certain king of living being, and every living 
species has its own work or function” (p. xi). For Aristotle, to act morally 
is to act according to the nature of the self, which is to live a happy life, 
as he writes in the Nicomachean Ethics that:
Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and 
is the end of action. (Book I, 1097b) 
If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. 
But they are also good and noble, and have each of these 
attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges 
well about these attributes; his judgement is such as we 
have described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and 
most pleasant thing in the world (Book I, 1099a).
Now virtuous actions are noble and done for the sake of the 
noble. Therefore the liberal man, like other virtuous men, 
will give for the sake of the noble, and rightly; for he will 
give to the right people, the right amounts, and at the right 
time, with all the other qualifications that accompany right 
giving; and that too with pleasure or without pain; for that 
which is virtuous is pleasant or free from pain – least of 
all will it be painful (Book IV, 1120a).
It is not the capacity that makes the boaster, but the purpose; 
for it is in virtue of his state of character and by being 
a man of a certain kind that he is a boaster (Book IV, 1127b).
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We now can see that, for Aristotle, to act morally is to act not 
according to our subjective pleasures or happiness but according to the 
nature of the things themselves. The right thing to do exists prior to 
individuals and individuals must discover the telos or virtue of any social 
practice. For example, they should realize what characteristics are required 
for one to be called a good person. Moreover, Aristotle also believes that 
the purpose of government is to help men pursue noble actions, as he 
writes in the Politics that: 
It is clear therefore that the state is not an association of 
people dwelling in the same place, established to prevent its 
members from committing injustice against each other, and 
to promote transactions. Certainly all these features must 
be present if there is to be a state; but even the presence 
of every one of them does not make a state ipso facto. The 
state is an association intended to enable its members, in 
their households and the kinships, to live well; its purpose 
is a perfect and self-sufficient life ... So we must lay it 
down that the association which is a state exists not for the 
purpose of living together but for the sake of noble actions 
(Book III, 1280b29-1281a2).
Now we can see how Locke and Aristotle reason for their 
comprehensive/metaphysical theories of the person. For Locke, a person 
is created by God, and doing the right thing is to act according to God’s 
command; for Aristotle, a person is created and defined by the nature/
telos of itself, and doing the right thing is to act according to the highest 
nature of the self. So far, I may be criticized for failing to acknowledge 
that both Locke and Aristotle do not hold that everyone is morally equal 
as some may be masters some may be slaves. I would argue that my real 
point of discussing them is not to say that both of them really give moral 
power to each individual equally, but that their arguments can support the 
notion metaphysically. In other words, I suggest that one may borrow this 
argument (God’s command – Locke; Teleology – Aristotle) to advocate 
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the notion that everyone should be morally equal.
Now let me explore another comprehensive/metaphysical theory 
of the person of Immanuel Kant. According to Kant (1785), a person is 
perceived to live in two different worlds, the noumenal and empirical/
phenomenal world9; but to be a moral person, one needs to move from 
the empirical world, in which his actions are determined by their own 
different empirical conditions and conceptions of the good, to the noumenal 
world, in which his actions are determined by pure practical reason or 
universal moral laws; only in the noumenal world that a person can realize 
his real self or higher nature10 of the self, which is a rational being. As Kant 
(1785) writes that:
Hence he has two points of view from which he can regard 
himself, and recognize laws of the exercise of his faculties, 
and consequently of all his actions: first, so far as he 
belongs to the world of sense, he finds himself subject to 
laws of nature (heteronomy); secondly, as belonging to the 
intelligible world, under laws which being independent on 
nature have their foundation not in experience but in reason 
alone (pp.84-5).
If therefore I were only a member of the world of understanding, 
then all my actions would perfectly conform to the principle 
of autonomy of the pure will; if I were only a part of the world 
of sense they would necessarily be assumed to conform 
wholly to the natural law of desires and inclinations, in 
other words, to the heteronomy of nature. (The former 
would rest on morality as the supreme principle, the latter 
on happiness.) (p.86).
What he morally “ought” is then what he necessarily 
“would” as a member of the world of the understanding, 
and is conceived by him as an “ought” only inasmuch as 
he likewise considers himself as a member of the world 
of sense (pp. 87-8).
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In this sense Sandel (2009) concisely articulates Kant’s theory 
of the person: “Kant argues that every person is worthy of respect, not 
because we own ourselves but because we are rational beings, capable of 
reason; we are also autonomous beings, capable of acting and choosing 
freely. Kant doesn’t mean that we always succeed in acting rationally, or 
in choosing autonomously. Sometimes we do and sometimes we don’t. 
He means only that we have the capacity for reason, and for freedom, and 
that this capacity is common to human beings as such” (p.105). Therefore, 
according to Kant, the fact that a human being is capable of reason is 
the foundation of the moral action. One may argue that Kant’s theory of 
the person is more acceptable than that of Locke and Aristotle because 
it does not base moral judgement on God and the essence of the person, 
which is quite controversial, but I would argue that Kant’s theory is not 
less controversial than that of Locke and Aristotle.
It should be noted that there are clearly two different statements 
of the notion “since we are all rational beings who are capable of reason, 
so we should act according to the moral laws determined by rational 
beings”; the first statement, which is “we are all rational beings who are 
capable of reason,” can be scientifically proved; the second statement, 
which is “we should act according to the moral laws determined by 
rational beings,” cannot be scientifically proved because it is a normative 
statement engaging with the language of moral judgement, e.g. good 
or bad, moral or immoral, and so on. In this sense moral and political 
philosophy which must engage in judging what’s the right thing to do 
is scientifically unprovable; it may be provable that doing action A may 
make me happy, but it is unprovable that I should do action A, as it may 
be the case that I should do something else despite it does not make me 
happy; moral judgement does not lie in the scientific/provable facts, but 
in a given unprovable premise. 
In this sense I may accept that “we are all rational beings who 
are capable of reason” as it can be scientifically proved, and this is less 
controversial; but despite of that acceptance, I do not need to follow that 
“so we should act according to the moral laws determined by rational 
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beings.” Why do we use the sentence “Since ..., So ...” here? I would argue 
that these two sentences can be combined rationally only if we already 
give our unprovable moral values to the first sentence; that is, we must 
already value the fact of the capacity for reason in the first place, otherwise 
one can refuse to accept the second sentence that “so, we should act 
according to the moral laws.” I agree with Taylor (1985b) who brilliantly 
argues that “the mere possession of the capacity will have no normative 
consequences at all for us if we do not share the conviction that this 
capacity commands respect” (p.192), and that “beings with these capacities 
command our respect, because these capacities are of special significance 
for us; they have a special moral status” (p.193). In this sense Kant’s 
theory of the person is also controversial as it is based on an unprovable 
moral value he gives to the world in the first place; he must see that the 
capacity for reason is good in itself, otherwise the mere fact that we are 
all capable of reason cannot support his moral viewpoint.
It is worth noting that my above argument can be applied to 
other similar notions, e.g. “since individuals are the smallest atomistic 
creatures, so they should have equal moral power.” Again, this notion 
is controversial and based on a particular comprehensive/metaphysical 
theory of the person, as those who hold this notion must value the being 
of the smallest atomistic creature in the first place, otherwise being of this 
creature would be nothing to with its normative statement at all. So far, 
we have seen that a theory of the person is indispensable because different 
theories mean different principles of justice, and that any theory of the 
person must be based on any particular comprehensive and metaphysical 
doctrines. The next question is if Rawls’ attempt to create a theory of the 
person rather than comprehensive and metaphysical is defensible, that is, 
is his political liberalism defensible?
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A political theory of the person: Why is rawls’ political liberalism 
indefensible?
Having seen that many previous theories of the person must 
engage in controversial comprehensive doctrines in one way or another, 
Rawls’ project is to construct a theory of justice without relying on any 
comprehensive theory of the person in order to make his principle more 
acceptable as it does not involve any controversies about the nature of 
the person; as Rawls (1977, p.165) argues that
The Problem is this: to develop a viable Kantian conception 
of justice the force and content of Kant’s doctrine must 
be detached from its background in transcendental 
idealism and given a procedural interpretation by means 
of the construction of the original position. It must then be 
shown that the construction, which draws upon the idea of 
the social contract, is not subject to the cogent objections 
that idealists raised against the contract doctrine of their 
day ... I have tried to show how the conception of justice as 
fairness avoids these and similar objections. The procedural 
interpretation of Kant’s view not only satisfies the canon 
of a reasonable empiricism, but its use of the idea of the 
social contract meets Hegel’s criticisms [italics added].
Rawls’ political liberalism aims to complete two tasks; one is to 
preserve a Kantian conception of justice, another is to replace Kant’s 
transcendental idealism, which is comprehensive, with a reasonable 
empiricism, which Rawls thinks is not comprehensive as it is based on 
the idea of the social contract. If he can accomplish these two tasks, 
then Rawls’ political liberalism is defensible. However, I argue that 
Rawls’ political liberalism is indefensible because these two tasks are 
theoretically impossible in the first place. As I have shown, Rawls’ 
argument is not based on the idea of the social contract, but on his particular 
theory of the person; since different theories of the person lead to different 
principles of justice. Rawls (1977) himself accepts this fact: “once we 
think of the members of society as free and equal moral persons, it is 
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natural for a social contract view to take the basic structure of society as 
the primary subject of justice” (p.164). Rawls’ principles of justice are 
impossible without his particular theory of the person, which is a person 
who is morally free and equal. I will argue in this section that, however 
reasonable his theory of the person is, his theory of the person is also 
comprehensive/metaphysical. This is not to say that everyone should 
be morally free and equal, but that the notion is based on a particular 
comprehensive conception of the person/good.
Rawls would argue that his theory of the person is merely a device 
of representation is untenable because, as I have shown in the section 
of “A Political Economy Critique,” his theory is just one of all possible 
alternatives; even though I agree with him that a theory of the person is 
simply a device of representation, I do not need to agree with him that a 
person should be blind to any conception of the good or morally equal and 
free, and so on; therefore Rawls’ theory of the person must be based on a 
particular comprehensive conception of the person. To defend his political 
view, Rawls can criticize my argument with two possible arguments; first 
he may reply that his theory of the person is political, not comprehensive 
because it is widely accepted by democratic values; second he may reply 
that this is because it is more reasonable than other theories of the person, 
that is, it is simply a “thin” theory of the person, which assumes simply 
a quite general characteristics of the person (Rawls, 1971).
Let me discuss the first reply. Rawls (1999) argues that
I suggest that we leave aside how people’s comprehensive 
doctrines connect with the content of the political conception 
of justice and, instead, regard that content as arising from the 
various fundamental ideas drawn from the public political 
culture of a democratic society. Putting people’s comprehensive 
doctrines behind the veil of ignoranceenables us to find a 
political conception of justice that can be the focus of an 
overlapping consensus and thereby serve as a public basis 
of justification in a society marked by the fact of reasonable 
pluralism [italics added] (p.32).
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This is the fact that citizens in a pluralist liberal democratic 
society realize that they cannot reach agreement, or even 
approach mutual understanding, on the basis of their 
irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines. Thus, when citizens 
are discussing fundamental political questions, they appeal 
not to those doctrines, but to a reasonable family of political 
conceptions of right and justice, and so to the idea of the 
politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens. 
This does not mean that doctrines of faith or nonreligious 
(secular) doctrines cannot be introduced into political 
discussion, but rather that citizens introducing them should 
also provide sufficient grounds in public reason for the 
political policies that religious or nonreligious doctrines 
support [italics added] (p.125). 
Therefore this reply/argument can be articulated as follows: since a 
democratic society requires pluralism which enables its members to pursue 
their own comprehensive doctrines in the private sphere, it is unreasonable 
to impose any particular comprehensive doctrines on the whole society 
as other members may not share the same doctrine; it is more reasonable 
to use a political principle like democratic value or pluralism to govern 
the whole society; it does not embrace any particular comprehensive 
doctrine, but simply a political value. In other words, persons should be 
conceived morally free and equal not because it is metaphysically true but 
because it is reasonable to a democratic society. Despite the soundness 
of this argument, it is far from being neutral among any particular 
comprehensive doctrines.
It may be true that to preserve a democratic society, we need political 
liberalism, political conception of the person, reasonable pluralism, the 
public political culture of a democratic society, and so on, but the question 
is why a democratic society in the first place? Why should a democratic 
society be valued in the first place? Rawls may argue that this is because 
a democratic society is best suitable for individuals who are morally free 
and equal, but this indicates that a theory of the person is the foundation 
of his argument. Thus the real question would be why should we hold that 
Wanpat Youngmevittaya  107
every individual is morally equal and free in the first place? This question 
can be answered straightforwardly through comprehensive doctrines, e.g. 
this should be so because this is a metaphysical truth, and doing the right 
thing is to fulfill the nature of the person, and so on. But this answer is 
clearly impossible for political liberalism; instead, it must be answered 
through political conceptions, e.g. this should be so because it is reasonable for 
individuals who are morally free and equal. And the old question would 
be raised again: why should we hold that individuals are morally equal 
free and equal in the first place? At the end, political liberalism would 
become merely an arbitrary principle which lacks foundation.
Now let me discuss the second reply. As I said, the secret of Rawls’ 
principles of justice relies on his theory of the person in the original 
position, which is articulated as the “circumstances of justice,” so I will 
discuss why Rawls’ circumstances of justice are comprehensive. It should 
be noted that Rawls himself accepts that he needs some conception of the 
good to form the person in the original position, but this conception must 
be too thin and weak to be called a comprehensive doctrine, as Rawls 
(1971) argues that, 
But to establish these principles it is necessary to rely on 
some notion of goodness, for we need assumptions about 
the parties motives in the original position. Since these 
assumptions must not jeopardize the prior place of the concept 
of right, the theory of the good used in arguing for the 
principles of justice is restricted to the bare essentials. This 
account of the good I call the thin theory: its purpose is to 
secure the premises about primary goods requires to arrive 
at the principles of justice. Once this theory is worked out 
and the primary goods accounted for, we are free to use the 
principles of justice in the further development of what I 
shall call the full theory of the good [italics added] (p.396).
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There is no inconsistency, then, in supposing that once the 
veil of ignorance is removed, the parties find that they have 
ties of sentiment and affection, and want to advance the 
interests of others and to see their ends attained. But the 
postulate of mutual disinterest in the original position is 
made to insure that the principles of justice do not depend 
upon strong assumptions. Recall that the original position is 
meant to incorporate widely shared and yet weak conditions. 
A conception of justice should not presuppose, then, 
extensive ties of natural sentiment. At the basis of the theory, 
one tries to assume as little as possible [underline added] 
(p.129).
But a human society is characterized by the circumstances 
of justice. The account of these conditions involves no 
particular theory of human motivation. Rather, its aim is 
to include in the description of the original position the 
relations of individuals to one another which set the stage 
for questions of justice [italics added] (pp.129-30).
They assume that they would prefer more primary social 
goods rather than less. Of course, it may turn out, once 
the veil of ignorance is removed, that some of them for 
religious or other reasons may not, in fact, want more of 
these goods. But from the standpoint of the original position, 
it is rational for the parties to suppose that they do want a 
larger share, since in any case they are not compelled to 
accept more if they do not wish to, nor does a person suffer 
from a greater liberty [italics added] (p.142).
We now can see that Rawls distinguishes between the thin/weak 
theory of the good/person and the full/strong theory of the good/person; 
while the former is acceptable to a party in the original position, the latter 
is not. Please notice that, despite his use of conceptions of the good, he 
still believes that his conception of the good is not based on a particular 
comprehensive theory, as Rawls (1993) argues that “the veil of ignorance, 
to mention one prominent feature of that position, has no specific 
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metaphysical implications concerning the nature of the self” (p.27). Rawls 
believes that by using the thin/weak theory of the good/person, which is 
the “the more, the better” motivation and the maximin motivation, he can 
avoid any comprehensive doctrines. But I will argue that his thin/weak 
theory of the good/person is also comprehensive.
First of all, how do we distinguish between the thin and full theory 
of the good? What is the definition of the thin theory? Rawls does not 
discuss these issues in detail, but we can articulate as follows: the thin 
theory is any characteristics of the person which are widely accepted 
and less controversial; the full theory is any characteristics which are 
less common and quite controversial. But this definition is controversial 
itself, as Sandel (1982) asks that “weak or strong with respect to what?” 
(p.45). I am sure that Rawls would say that a self-interested motivation 
is a weak/thin theory, while benevolence and altruism are full and strong. 
The question is how does he know that this is true? Rawls can only answer 
this question in two different ways. 
First, he might argue that this is true because of empirical facts; 
since many or most people see it that way, he also sees it that way, too. 
But this is problematic. While it is true that many modern societies would 
accept that thin-full distinction, it is also true that many pre-modern 
societies may not; from those pre-modern societies’ points of view, 
benevolence/altruism may be more widely stressed than self-interest, 
and so it should be a thin theory to them. Rawls might argue that we do 
not need to take those pre-modern societies into account because they 
are irrational. But this raises another serious problem: he must judge 
who is rational/irrational by his own particular conception of the good 
because he must assert this even before any social contract begins. Let me 
assume that there are only 100 people in the world, and that 90 of them 
hold that self-interest is a thin theory while benevolence is a full theory, 
and another 10 hold otherwise. In this sense it is clearly that the notion 
that self-interest is a thin theory is more widely accepted, and so Rawls 
should hold this view. But if he really holds this view, then what is the 
difference between his liberalism and his enemies, utilitarianism, which 
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favors the majority’s views? Don’t forget that Rawls’ theory of justice is 
constructed to overcome utilitarianism in the first place, so Rawls cannot 
hold this view.
Second, he might argue that this is true because of its rationality 
itself; since people may have different views concerning the thin and 
full conceptions, we must assert that it is always rational to assume 
that self-interest is thin, and benevolence is full. But this reply is also 
problematic: how do we know if a theory is more or less controversial and 
widely accepted if we do not refer to actual persons? Since the concept of 
‘controversy’ would be meaningless if it is beyond real persons’ opinions, 
Rawls now has only two choices. First, he must embrace only the first 
reply, which holds that the distinction between the thin and full theories 
depends on empirical facts. Second, he must embrace only the second 
reply, which holds that the distinction between the thin and full theories 
depends on his own conception of rationality. Whatever he chooses, his 
political liberalism would collapse because for the first choice, empirical 
facts cannot support his theory, and for the second choice, his theory is 
based on a comprehensive/controversial doctrines.
I also want to argue further that even though he is successful in 
distinguishing between the thin and full theories of the good, his thin 
theory is also comprehensive. Now let’s assume that his definition of the 
thin theory is sound and clear, the question is why should we hold that 
the thin theory is more reasonable than the full theory? As I have argued, 
Rawls cannot refer to the majority’s views as it would undermine his 
whole theory. The only reason is that he already values the thin theory as 
such, and this will also undermine his political liberalism as the following 
reason. For instance, if a person really believes in God’s command which 
teaches him that everyone is not morally free and equal, and everyone is 
not born by accident but by God’s intention; it is not accident that someone 
is born rich and someone is born poor, and so on, thus any income 
redistribution is unjust because it violates God’s command. How would 
Rawls respond? I guess he would say that his belief is too strong to be 
accepted by everyone, so his belief cannot become the theory of justice. 
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But, as we have seen, it is impossible for any single principle, weak or 
strong, to be accepted by everyone. Rawls would argue that he means 
only every ‘rational’ person, not everyone in the usual sense. But where 
does his conception of rationality come from? It is clearly not from actual 
persons’ opinions, but from his own reasoning.
One may argue that we should not give the moral power to those 
who believe that everyone is not morally equal and free because they 
violate the rights in the first place. But this argument is clearly irrelevant 
and misplaced because we must realize that Rawls’ theory of the person 
is formed “before” any principle of justice occurs, and, as Rawls 
claims, “before” principles of justice come to play no one can claim his 
“rights” absolutely. But Rawls (1971) seems to violate his own theory 
by asserting that “these assumptions [conception of goodness] must not 
jeopardize the prior place of the concept of right” (p.396). This means 
that, for Rawls, what is just/unjust can be judged “before” any principle 
of justice is chosen, as Rawls (1971) himself accepts that “the idea of the 
original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed 
to will be just” [italics added] (p.136), and that “if anyone after due 
reflection prefers a conception of justice to another, then they all do, and a 
unanimous agreement can be reached” [italics added] (p. 139), and that 
“if a knowledge of particulars is allowed, then the outcome is biased by 
arbitrary contingencies” (p.141).
Let’s us discuss these passages critically. Indeed, the ultimate 
moral judgement of his theory of justice is not based on the agreement 
of the social contract, but on the circumstances of justice (fair procedure/
due reflection) characterized by Rawls himself. As he accepted, simply 
the fact that people come to agree upon the contract cannot guarantee 
that the really just principles of justice would be reached, this is why he 
must propose that the agreements would be just only if they are proceeded 
under a fair procedure characterized by “his” certain characteristics. 
The notion that particular knowledge is arbitrary contingency may seem 
rational to many people, but this clearly cannot be the case for everyone; 
thus his notion is also controversial and comprehensive as it is merely a 
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particular theory. Since Rawls’ principles of justice are already guaranteed 
by his own circumstances of justice, which holds that it is “unjust” for a 
person to know his particular conceptions of the good before the contract, 
the ultimate justification of his theory is based on his own particular 
comprehensive doctrines rather than the social contract; that is, he already 
knows what is just and unjust before any social contract happens.
According to the difference principle, Rawls embraces two 
different conceptions of the comprehensive doctrine: one is a particular 
assumption of the human motivation, another is the deontological theory 
of the person. For the first conception, it would be impossible to talk about 
economic (dis)advantages if we could not make a comparison between 
each individual’s good/end. He needs to assume that ‘everyone’ prefers 
‘more to less’ and material wealth is very important to them. Again, this 
assumption seems very common to many of us, but there is no good reason 
to believe that this is what ‘everybody’ actually wants unconditionally; 
thus, to make the difference principle possible he needs to lean on a 
particular assumption of the human motivation which is not neutral/political. 
For the second conception, the difference principle reflects his 
deontological theory of the person in a deep sense. It is true that he allows 
‘actual’ persons to pursue their own goods and properties as they see fit, 
but it is also true that he does not allow ‘anyone’ to be entitled to their 
own goods and properties absolutely; instead they all have to be subject 
to the difference principle which emerges from the agreement among 
deontological persons. All of this means that his theory of justice is more 
acceptable to those whose comprehensive doctrine is individualism than 
those whose comprehensive doctrine is not. Let’s us come back to my 
example of someone who believes that any income redistribution is unjust 
because it violates God’s command. Rawls would argue that those claims 
are too ‘strong’ and ‘contingent’ to be a ‘general’ conception of the person 
who is rational enough to choose the best principles of justice. But this is 
problematic; since he finds that some ‘actual’ persons are irrational and 
are not suitable to do the task of discovering the principle of justice, the 
first task would be to make them ‘rational’ by forcing them to conceive 
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themselves as an unencumbered self. In other words, Rawls has to insist 
that those who have such ‘strong’ conceptions of the person are irrational, 
and they need to ‘change’ their minds by accepting the notion that we 
are all born accidentally, not according to our choices in previous lives, 
or by God’s command. This is not to say that it is reasonable, but that 
Rawls cannot avoid choosing a particular conception of the good/person 
which is very comprehensive.
Rawls may argue that this conception is not comprehensive/ 
metaphysical because he still allows anyone to hold that we are all born 
as a result of our choices in previous lives, by God’s intention, but only 
if he or she accepts the difference principle. But this is very paradoxical 
since the foundation of the difference principle is the belief that we are 
all born by accident, thus any belief that holds otherwise can be accepted 
at best as the second-order truth. Since Rawls’ two principles of justice 
are always the first virtues of the whole society, to accept them is to also 
believe that his theory of the person in the original position is meta-
physically true. Rawls may argue that his theory of the person is simply 
a device to represent his philosophy, and actual persons do not need to 
hold it in the reality. But if this is really the case, then why doesn’t he 
allow actual persons to hold their “strong” conceptions of the good as 
the first principle rather than his two principles of justice? Rawls would 
argue that since they already choose the two principles of justice by 
themselves in the original position, they cannot refuse to accept them. But 
they may argue that they never accept such principles or anything in the 
original position at all, why do they need to accept them? Rawls would 
argue that even though they never actually do so, they must accept them 
because if they had thought of themselves rationally, then they would 
have accepted them.
Now we reach the climax. Rawls’ principles of justice can be 
justified only if every actual person accepts that his real nature/essence 
is what described by Rawls’ theory of the person in the original position. 
To accept that I myself have chosen those principles of justice is to 
accept that the conception of my real essence as a person has already been 
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described by Rawls himself. In this sense anyone who believes that he 
was born not by accident must accept that his comprehensive doctrine 
is at best the second-order truth; there is something truer than his own 
conception. Even though they are free to pursue their own conceptions 
of the good, they must be aware all the time that a theory of the person 
described in the original position is always truer than their conceptions. 
Sandel (1982) rightly argues that “we must be prepared to live with 
the vision contained in the original position, mutual disinterest and all, 
prepared to live with it in the sense of accepting its description as an 
accurate reflection of human moral circumstance, consistent with our 
understanding of ourselves” (p.48).
If Rawls still insists that “if they had thought of themselves 
rationally, then they would have accepted them,” then he cannot deny that 
people are first required to understand themselves as Rawls described in 
the original position, otherwise he or she cannot accept that they have 
chosen principles of justice by themselves; since two principles of justice 
are chosen by a deontological person characterized by Rawls, these 
principles are just for those who really possess those characteristics. In this 
sense even though a person holds a strong conception of the good which 
is incompatible with principles of justice in his private life, he cannot 
take it too seriously because he must realize that that is not his real nature 
of the self as his real self must be compatible with principles of justice. 
Although Rawls would say that they are free to believe that we are not 
born by accident, he implies that the belief is less true than the belief that 
we are born by accident. But if Rawls insists that they must hold the two 
principles of justice even though they do not view themselves that way, 
then his principles of justice would simply be arbitrary, because they must 
accept principles which they themselves may disagree or have nothing to 
do with their selves at all. His principles use people as a means. 
The only way to get out of this situation is to insist that his principles 
require people to realize their real selves. To force them to accept two 
principles of justice is not merely to use them but to make them realize 
their real selves. In other words, Rawls needs to accept that his theory is 
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comprehensive/metaphysical, and since his principles of justice (political 
sphere) are comprehensive, so the ‘private sphere’ must be determined/
constrained by some particular comprehensive doctrines, not neutral/
political values. It is impossible to separate the ‘political’ sphere from 
the ‘private’ sphere, both political and personal spheres equally require 
some particular moral comprehensive doctrines.
Conclusion
In contrast to Rawls’ political liberalism, which holds that it 
is possible to separate justice and the political sphere from any moral 
comprehensive doctrines in the sense that principles of justice are not 
based on any of those doctrines but on political values themselves, I have 
argued that political liberalism, embraces a particular metaphysical/
comprehensive theory of the good/person, which is an unencumbered 
self. From a political economy perspective, I have argued that Rawls’ 
principles of justice and the idea of the original position are justified not 
on the basis of the social contract argument, but on Rawls’ theory of the 
person or the circumstances of justice, which are determined by his own 
conception of rationality. Without his theory of the person his principles 
of justice would be impossible because different theories of the person 
lead to different principles of justice. From a philosophical perspective, 
I have argued that Rawls’ theory of the person in the original position is 
comprehensive rather than political because its characteristics are given 
by what Rawls thinks are just in the first place, and that political sphere 
cannot be separated from private sphere because principles of justice 
governing political sphere are always prior to any other comprehensive 
doctrines in private sphere. 
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end notes
11 Rawls sometimes uses the term ‘device of representation’ instead (1993, p. 75).
2 To be clear, I think that Rawls’ political liberalism is also metaphysical. But I 
intentionally use the term ‘comprehensive’ in many places because this should be boarder than 
merely ‘metaphysical,’ and Rawls would find it harder to deny.
3 Important certain characteristics of the person in the original position are that each 
individual has the equal moral power to decide the best principle of justice and that they do not 
know their own social and economic positions and conceptions of good life in the reality until the 
veil of ignorance is uncovered. Thus, the person in the original position is described as a rational 
being whose self is prior to any end/good (deontological/unencumbered self).
4 In fact, Kymlicka (1989) defends Rawls’ political neutrality, but the neutrality and 
political liberalism share the same aspects so I think we can say that Kymlicka also defends 
political liberalism.
5 She usually uses the term “considerations.”
6 This table is revised from Stiglitz & Driffill (2000, p. 381).
7 My point here is not to judge whether we are all encumbered or unencumbered selves 
as Sandel claims. I just want to show that Rawls’ theory of the person cannot avoid this debate, 
and so his theory must be comprehensive.
8 The question is why is physical harm more concerned than spiritual harm? Why is 
it possible to criticize someone’s beliefs but impossible to attack him physically? This implies 
that liberals already judge that physical harm is more dangerous/wrong than spiritual/intellectual 
harm. In other words, since an individual is conceived as an unencumbered self who is prior to 
any ends/beliefs, so it is ‘acceptable’ to attack his belief as it is just a contingent part of his self, 
but it is ‘unacceptable’ to attack his body because this is the most fundamental element of his self.
9 Kant (1785) actually uses the term the intelligible world or the world of understanding 
instead of the noumenal world, and the term the world of sense instead of the empirical/phenomenal 
world. But I think that the noumenal and empirical/phenomenal world are also appropriate here. 
Please see Sandel (1982).
10 One may argue that Kant does not defend a rational being on the basis of higher 
goods/nature of the person. But I would argue that without this assertion, Kant’ theory would be 
inconsistent. This is because since Kant wants to avoid using people as a means and to respect 
them as an ends in itself, to say that every rational being must obey the universal moral laws 
without making it clear that doing so is the way to realize their real selves would be to say that 
they must do things which they may not agree and has noting to do with their selves at all; it is 
like imposing the moral laws on people regardless of their consent. To avoid using people as a 
means and to preserve the moral laws is to propose that complying to the moral laws are things 
good in itself and good for every rational being. In this way to impose the universal moral law 
on everyone can avoid using people as a means because even though they may not consent to do 
so, we can argue that this is the real nature of a rational being which they need to realize, despite 
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they may not realize it now. In this sense I agree with Taylor (1985b) who argues that “rationality 
thus imposes obligations on us. Being rational agents, that is possessing a capacity so much 
higher than nature, puts us under an obligation to live up to this status. We could say that the 
fundamental principle underlying Kant’s whole ethical theory is something of this form: live up 
to what you really are – rational agents. Because it is something higher, rationality commands our 
respect. That is why we experience the moral commands as higher than the demands of nature. 
We recognize that the moral law is something that commands our respect (Achtung)” (p.324).
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